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WHO MAY PRACTICE, AND WHAT CONSTITUTES THE
PRACTICE OF LAW*

A review of bar journals and publications from the nation
at large indicates a growing tendency eventually to return the
practice of law to the hands of those only to whom it was
entrusted when Coke and Blackstone were names far more
familiar than they now are, and one State Supreme Court
apparently has found it necessary, at least advisable, to define
what constitutes the practice of law.
Undoubtedly the incorporation of the ever-increasing
multitude of associations and agencies for the purpose of using
the practice of law as a business, and placing it on a level
with a grocery, department store, or manufacturing establishment-wholly disregarding that the law is a profession, the
conduct of which must be kept on the highest plane-has
caused the leaders of the bar to pause and consider whether
it may not be time to find out where we are drifting.
When I refer to the practice of law as a business I mean
the great number of agencies or associations which are
ostensibly collection agents but which purchase accounts and
thereby become directly and pecuniarily interested in the
subject matter later to be discussed with a debtor or third
party and in any litigation which may arise, which hire one
or more attorneys at a fixed yearly salary to collect their
pecuniary interest in the legal business which it is transacting.
It was recognized in the earliest days of the law that the
counselor should have no pecuniary interest, other than his
fee, in the matter entrusted to him, and champerty and maintenance were the barriers erected against the practitioner who
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otherwise might have disregarded the high ethics of his profession.
Nearly every state forbids one to practice law unless
duly qualified and licensed, under penalty. Few states have
thought it necessary to define the practice of law and it may
become necessary for future legislatures, or state supreme
courts, to follow the example of the Supreme Court of
Georgia, in the recent case of Boykin, Solicitor General vs.
Hopkins, et al, which practically changed the definition of
what constitutes the practice of law in that state as it was fixed
by the decision in Atlanta Title & Trust Co., vs. Boykin, 172
G. 437, in which the court confined the work of the lawyer to
that in. the courts and practically left the outside to anyone
who desired to practice, but the recent case-declares
"we are of the opinion that the practice of law at the time the application for
charter in this case was made, was not confined to practice in the courts of
this State; but was of larger scope, including the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to any action or special proceedings in any court or other
judicial body, conveyancing; the preparation of all legal instruments of all
kinds whereby a legal right is secured; the rendering of opinions as to the
validity or invalidity of the title to real or personal property, the giving of any
legal advice; and any action taken for others in any matter connected with
the law."

In that connection it is interesting to note the action of
the General Assembly of Virginia for 1932. Prior to 1932
the practice of law in Virginia was apparently confined to acts
done in court but the General Assembly this year broadened
the scope so as to include
"improper solicitation of any legal or professional business or employment
either directly or indirectly; also providing that contracts secured for attorneys
by runners and cappers shall be void, and providing penalties therefor; defining
a runner or capper as any person, firm, associate, or corporation acting in any
manner or in any capacity as an agent for an attorney at law in the solicitation
or procurement of business for such attorney at law, etc."

By analogy there is but little difference between the situation thus sought to be reached by the Virginia legislature, and
the act of the various collection agencies in advertising that
they maintain a legal department, or advertising the purchase
and collection of accounts in which they have a pecuniary
interest.
It is elemental, and fundamental, that a corporation or
association cannot practice law for the reason that it cannot
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comply with the requirements which are imposed upon
individuals as prerequisites to enable them to obtain license
to practice. The great weight of decisions of almost all of
the states of this country agree with the above proposition in
denying corporations the right to practice.
One collection agency in this city advertises that it maintains a legal department. Another agency sends out collection
letters somewhat in simulation of process and in a column provided therefor lists the amount of the indebtedness and a fixed
"docket fee" in addition and thus may mulct an ignorant or
uninitiated individual. Another agency used to issue collection demands strongly simulating process but discontinued the
form of the letters when complaint was referred to a grievance
committee. Still other agencies offend in various ways.
There are numerous individuals who appear daily in our
justice of the peace courts as assignees of claims, who prepare
a complaint, try the issues of a case, assume to know the law
and rules of practice, appeal an unfavorable decision to the
county court and actually practice law without other qualification or license.
So far as Colorado is concerned, Sec. 6017 C. L. 1921,
provides punishment for contempt of the supreme court for
any unlicensed person who practices law in courts of record.
Does the rule of strict construction of a penal statute permit
unlicensed persons to practice in justice of the peace courts,
the latter not being courts of record, or is the power of our
Supreme Court sufficiently plenary to regulate and control
the practice of law in the justice courts? Our constitution
gives the Supreme Court a general control over all inferior
courts, and Supreme Court Rule 83c forbids practice in justice
of the peace courts of disbarred attorneys and applicants for
admission to the bar rejected because unable to show good
character. But, did the Supreme Court by the passage of that
rule and its specific prohibition against a certain class of persons feel that there was a question of its power otherwise to
regulate the practicing personnel of such courts?
It could hardly be so construed, as the disbarred attorney
has resumed his role of a layman and the rejected applicant
never has departed therefrom, and if such individuals can be
barred from the justice courts for moral unfitness, lack of
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preparation to acquire the mental qualifications requisite for
admission to the bar of this state, as well as failure to become
licensed to practice, should be sufficient to bar the rest of the
laymen.
"Lawyers have been the object of criticism since first they made their
appearance, but not until they had become group conscious and organized did
they become articulate on this issue. In associations they began to discover
their weaknesses and their strength. Once launched, the movement toward
bar organization spread rapidly into a network of state and local associations
and a national association. These associations, while they devote time to the
discussion of problems inherent to the profession, and to matters social, give
attention to definitions of professional objectives.
They have formulated
codes of ethics; they have been influential in setting standards for admissions
to the bar; they have advocated the disbarment of undesirable members; and,
through committees and representatives, they have pressed these issues before
the courts. Many of their efforts, no doubt, are futile and ill-conceived.
Much that is desirable they leave untouched and undone. But with all, they
are today conscious, at least on the part of many of their leaders, that the
bar must improve its situation in the public esteem or relinquish its position
of leadership in public affairs. And with this there has come a feeling, faltering at first but growing in intensity, that one of the faults of the profession
lies in the ethical and mental caliber of its membership".
(In the

BAR EXAMINER,

University of Illinois).

May 1932, by Albert J. Harno, Dean, College of Law,

For many years the members of the legal profession
swayed and guided the destinies of the nation and of the states,
because the profession was held on a high plane and was so
regarded, but in later days the attorney has acquired some disrepute. Efforts should be made looking towards the restoration of our profession to its former high estate. With proper
co-operation the unlawful practice of the law can be stopped.
The Chicago Bar Association, aroused by charges of incompetency and corruption against judges and lawyers, has
started four investigations to "rid the legal profession of any
hint of racketeering." Vouchsafing absolute justice, leaders
in the inquiry promised today to "vindicate any judge or
lawyer who deserves it but to condemn those against whom
conclusive evidence is found."
In 1931 changes in rules for admission to the bar were
made in twenty-five states, the great majority of the changes
making for higher standards, but when one learns from the
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report of the Justice Court Committee (Dicta, June, 1932)
that our justice court cases alone, for the past .two years
averaged 690 civil cases monthly, one can appreciate that the
effort of bar associations to restore the confidence of the people
in the profession is meeting a serious obstacle when the law is
being used as a business by corporations and individuals otherwise unqualified as counselors at law and certainly unlicensed
and not pernmitted to practice in courts of record.
The broadest mind, and the most charitably inclined person will agree that the conduct of collection agencies and laymen-assignees as above related amounts to the practice of law
as a business, and if such conduct cannot now be reached by
statute, or by the power of a supreme court to regulate and
control the practice of the law, it is time the legislature should
enact statutes closing the justice of the peace courts to all except licensed attorneys, and defining what acts and conduct
constitute the practice of law.

NOTICE
Mr. F. D. Stackhouse, Clerk of the Denver District
Court calls attention to the following schedule and dates during which the various Judges will hold Court during the summer vacation period:
June
July
July
Aug.
Aug.

27th, 1932 to July 9th Inc., Judge Charles C. Sackman,
l1th, 1932 to July 23rd Inc., Judge E. V. Holland,
25th, 1932 to Aug. 6th Inc., Judge Henley A. Calvert,
8th, 1932 to Aug. 20th Inc., Judge J. C. Starkweather,
22nd, 1932 to Sept. 3rd Inc., Judge George F. Dunklee.
All Divisions convene September 6th, 1932.

